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PROCEEDINGS TO TERMINATE PARENTAL
RIGHTS: TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE
PROTECTION FOR PARENTS?
INTRODUCTION

Traditionally the courts of this country have been loathe
to interfere with the right of a parent' to the custody and control of his child.' Courts have characterized the parent's right
as a property interest,3 as a "natural and sacred" right,4 and
as "among the most basic of civil rights." 5 Many decisions
reflect a social interest in preserving the family unit.6
Although parental rights are recognized as important, they
1. A definition of parental rights is elusive. See generally Eekelaar, What Are
ParentalRights?, 89 L.Q. REv. 210 (1973). Eekelaar identifies and discusses the following rights: right to possession, right to visit the child, right to determine education,
right to determine religious upbringing, right to discipline the child, right to choose
medical treatment, right concerning the child's name, right to consent to marriage,
right to services, right to determine nationality and domicile, and right to appoint
guardians and consent to adoption.
Several of these rights are recognized by statute in California: CAL. Civ. CODE §
197.5 (West Supp. 1975) (right to visit); id. § 213 (West 1954) (right to determine
residence); id. § 4101 (West Supp. 1975) (right to consent to marriage); Cal. Stats.
(1975), ch. 1244, § 3, at 3438 (West Leg. Serv.) (right to custody, services and earnings),
amending CAL. CIv. CODE § 197 (West 1954); id. § 7, at 3440 (right to consent to
adoption), amending CAL. CIv. CODE § 224 (West 1954).
2. See, e.g., In re Gutierrez, 47 Cal. App. 128, 130, 190 P. 200, 202 (1920): "We
think it is only in instances where there is demonstrated incapacity or something akin
to criminal neglect that the law is justified in interfering with the natural relations of
parent and child."
3. See Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 152 P.2d 999 (1944); In re Campbell, 130
Cal. 380, 62 P. 613 (1900); Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d 636, 334 P.2d 1011 (1959);
Shea v. Shea, 100 Cal. App. 2d 60, 223 P.2d 32 (1950).
This concept has its roots in ancient law which treated all dependents as the
property of the head of the household. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic
Relations, 14 MicH. L. REV. 177, 180 (1916) [hereinafter cited as Pound].
4. In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 523, 126 P. 161, 165 (1912); accord, In re Campbell,
130 Cal. 380, 62 P. 613 (1900); In re White, 54 Cal. App. 2d 637, 129 P.2d 706 (1942);
Newby v. Newby, 55 Cal. App. 114, 202 P. 891 (1921).
5. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 688-89, 523 P.2d 244, 250, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 450
(1974), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); accord, In re Susan Lynn M., 53
Cal. App. 3d 300, 125 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975) (a liberty within the meaning of the due
process clause).
6. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); In re Newman, 88
Cal. App. 186, 262 P. 1112 (1927).
Commenting on the law's concern for the family unit, Pound stated, "family law
in general is one of the earliest branches of the law to become fixed and hence preserves
traces of an archaic condition in which group interests rather than individual interests
were secured." Pound, supra note 3, at 187.
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are not absolute.' In California, statutes have existed for judicially terminating parental rights since 1872.8 Early adoption
statutes provided that under certain conditions adoption,
which "severs absolutely the legal relation between the parents
and child," 9 could be granted without parental consent.' 0 The
juvenile court law enacted in 1915 provided for a separate proceeding for the purpose of declaring a child free of the custody
and control of his parents."
Today the exclusive judicial means of terminating parental rights in California is found in Civil Code sections 232
through 239.12 A termination proceeding may be brought under
the following circumstances: if the child has been abandoned,
abused, or neglected; if the parent is morally depraved or suffers from disability due to habitual use of alcohol or drugs; if
the parent has been convicted of a certain type of felony; if the
parent is declared mentally ill or deficient or is incapable of
supporting or controlling the child because of mental deficiency.' 3
In an effort to "[e]xpand [the] circumstances under
which an action may be brought,"' 4 the California Legislature
in 1973 established a general ground for freeing a child who has
been in foster care for two years: parental rights can be terminated if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that return
of the child to his parents would be detrimental to the child,
and if the parents are unable to provide a home, care and
7. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (parental rights are not beyond
limitation).
California has recognized this proposition by statute since 1872. CAL. CIv. CODE §
203 (West 1954): "The abuse of parental authority is the subject of judicial cognizance
in a civil action . . . and when the abuse is established, the child may be freed from
the dominion of the parent ....
"
8. Cal. Civil Code § 224 (1872), as amended, CAL.. CIv. CODE § 224 (West Supp.
1975).
9. In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 523, 126 P. 161, 165 (1912); see CAL. CIv. CODE §
229 (West 1954) (from the time of adoption the natural parents are "relieved of all
parental duties toward, and all responsibility for, the child so adopted, and have no
right over it").
10. Cal. Civil Code § 224 (1872), as amended, CAL.. CIv. CODE § 224 (West Supp.
1975).
For a comprehensive list of statutory reasons for dispensing with consent in adoption cases in other states, see Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which a
Child May be Adopted without the Consent of His Parent, 39 U. DET. L.J. 347, 362-64
nn.96-108 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Simpson!.
11. Cal. Stats. (1915), ch. 631, § 15g, at 1238.
12. CAL.. CiV. CODE §§ 232-39 (West Supp. 1975).
13. Id. § 232(a) (West Supp. 1975).
14. Cal. Stats. (1973), ch. 686, at 1427 (West Leg. Serv.).
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control, and are unable to maintain an adequate parental relationship with the child. 5
It is the view of this author that this statutory scheme 6
both underprotects and overprotects the natural parent-child
relationship. Major problem areas, with particular emphasis on
the 1973 amendment, include: inadequate notice, the "detriment to the child" test, the reasonable doubt standard of proof,
the evidence requirements, and failure to provide requirements
for permanent placements and speedy decisions. The purpose
of this comment is to identify and examine these problem
areas, with analysis focusing on section 232(a)(7), and to suggest changes which would render the proceedings more equitable to both parent and child.
NOTICE

When a petition has been filed to free a child from the
custody and control of his parents, the first problem encountered is whether the parents receive adequate notice. Notice to
the parents of such a proceeding is required by statute 7 as well
as by due process considerations."
Although the statute permits service by publication if the
mother or father cannot be located," the section has been con15. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1975) provides that a child may be
freed from the custody and control of his parents when the child comes within the
following description:
Who has been cared for in one or more foster homes under the supervision of the juvenile court, the county welfare department or other public
or private licensed child-placing agency for two or more consecutive
years, providing that the court finds beyond reasonable doubt that return
of the child to his parent or parents would be detrimental to the child
and that the parent or parents have failed during such period, and are
likely to fail in the future, to
(i) Provide a home for said child;
(ii) Provide care and control for the child; and
(iii) Maintain an adequate parental relationship with the child.
Physical custody of the child by the parent or parents for insubstantial periods of time during the required two-year period will not serve to
interrupt the running of such period.
16. CAl.. CIv. CODE §§ 232-39 (West Supp. 1975).
17. Id. § 235 (West Supp. 1975).
18. The United States Supreme Court, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), observed that notice and an opportunity to be heard
were fundamental to the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process. Id. at 314.
In Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), the Court held that failure to notify
a father of an adoption proceeding "violated the most rudimentary demands of due
process of law." Id. at 550.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 235(b) (West Supp. 1975).
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strued to require "a showing of due diligence to locate and serve
the parent as a prerequisite to an order for service upon him
by publication."I An allegation by the petitioner that the parents' address is unknown is not a sufficient showing to permit
service by publication."1
In a recent decision, In re B.G., 2" the California Supreme
Court emphasized the importance of notice in the context of a
child custody proceeding:
Since the interest of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his children is a compelling
one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights . . . the
*state, before depriving a parent of this interest, must afford him adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. 3
Although the right to notice of the proceeding appears to
be firmly established, it can be argued that current notice requirements are inadequate. Many termination proceedings are
uncontested because the parents cannot be located." 4 Studies
have revealed the paralyzing sense of guilt experienced by
many parents who have been deprived of the custody of their
children: "The sense of guilt and resulting hopelessness can be
so great that they repudiate the relationship altogether and feel
no sense of responsibility."5 Moreover, many parents apparently believe that the original placement of their children into
foster care is in fact a permanent placement." 6
20. In re Beebe, 40 Cal. App. 3d 643, 646, 115 Cal. Rptr. 322, 324 (1974).
21. Id.
22. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
23. Id. at 688-89, 523 P.2d at 250, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
24. Interview with Jeff Bryson, Deputy County Counsel for Santa Clara County,
in San Jose, California, Feb. 10, 1976. Mr. Bryson stated that these cases are "rarely
contested," and estimated that notice is by publication in nearly 50 percent of the
cases. In those cases notice is also sent to the parents' last known address. Mr. Bryson
also noted that generally the agency filing the petition or other county agencies have
made independent efforts to reach the parents.
By statute, the county counsel handles termination proceedings that are initiated
by the State Department of Social Welfare, a county welfare department, a county
adoption department, or a county probation department. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232.9 (West
Supp. 1975).
25. Jenkins, Filial Deprivation in Parents of Children in Foster Care, 14
CHILDREN 8, 10 (1967), quoting Britton, Casework Techniques in Child Care
Services,
CASEWORK.

January, 1955.

26. See Simpson, supra note 10. "Deprivation of custody under the dependency
statutes can mean adoption without consent of the parent in most of the states ....
Id. at 382.
This was true for California at one time. The first adoption statute, enacted in
1872, provided that parental consent could be dispensed with for a parent "who has
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Such is the aura of power surrounding a judge acting parens patriae that these demoralized parents simply let the
temporary disposition drift on until the child became inured to institutionalized life and the empty place at home
healed over.27
These feelings are often reinforced by social workers who discourage parents from maintaining contact with their children
in foster care."
The statutes do not require periodic review of most foster
care placements;2 9 therefore, a termination proceeding may be
the first court contact with the parents since placement. When
the parents cannot be located, notice is by publication," although, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, "It would be
idle to pretend that publication alone . . . is a reliable means
parties of the fact that their rights are
of acquainting interested
'3
courts.'
the
before
2
In an effort to meet the requirements of adequate notice
it is recommended that notice be given to parents at the time
of the original placement that foster care is temporary, and
that under certain circumstances a termination proceeding
may be brought. Those circumstances should be adequately
explained and the parents should be encouraged to maintain
contact with their child. 3 It is believed that such notice would
help counteract the feelings of demoralization that lead to a
loss of contact. One juvenile court judge who made the effort
to review all current placements in his court found that
[miost parents evidenced a renewed interest in their children when it appeared that they might lose them permabeen judicially deprived of the custody of the child on account of cruelty or neglect."
Cal. Civil Code § 224 (1872).
27. Dobson, The Juvenile Court and ParentalRights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 399 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Dobsoni.
28. See note 118 and accompanying text infra.
29. Only those placements made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 600 are subject to annual review. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 729 (West 1972).
30. CAL. CIV. COnE § 235(b) (West Supp. 1975).
31. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
32. The Mullane Court stated that notice must be "reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314. And further,
"Itihe means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id. at 315.
33. See notes 120-21 and accompanying text infra.
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nently and many made plans for return of their children
to their homes or those of relatives.3 4
If such an "early warning system" would encourage families to stay in contact during foster placement,"5 some termination proceedings might be avoided altogether, and when such
proceedings do become necessary, more parents could be located and would thus receive actual notice. This "early warning" notice, combined with the current requirement for notice
just prior to the proceeding, would better protect the important
interests at stake 6 and would promote the stated goal of
juvenile court law "to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible." 3
DETRIMENT TO THE CHILD TEST

The next problem faced by parents whose rights may be
judicially terminated is whether the parents' interest in the
custody of their child will be given preference over the claims
of third parties. In this regard it is important to know what test
the court will use to resolve conflicting claims. The 1973
amendment to Civil Code section 232 requires that before a
child can be freed from the custody and control of his parents
the court must find that "return of the child to his parent or
parents would be detrimental to the child."38 The decision of
the Legislature to use this "detriment to the child" standard
is significant since it represents, by implication, a decision not
to adopt a "best interests of the child" test.
As courts and scholars began to focus attention on the
rights of children,39 the "best interests of the child" was urged
as the appropriate standard for resolving disputes over child
custody.'" Under this test the child's welfare is considered as
34. Crary, A Juvenile Court's Responsibility to Neglected and Dependent
Children, 38 IOWA L. REV. 79, 80 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Crary].
35. In a recent termination proceeding, In re Susan Lynn M., 53 Cal. App. 3d
300, 125 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975), the court stated, "the Legislature obviously intended
that every effort be made to reunite the family" during the time the child is in placement. Id. at 311 n.3, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 714 n.3.
36. See notes 2-6 and accompanying text supra.
37. CAL. WEIF. & INST'NS CODE § 502 (West 1972).
38. CAl.. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1975). For the entire text of the
subsection, see note 15 supra.
(939. See, e.g., Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343
(1972); Pound, supra note 3, at 182.
40. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD (1973) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS];
Foster &
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paramount, and the interest of parents in the custody of their
children is not "thought of in terms of an absolute parental
factor in determining the best inright, but rather as another
41
child.
the
of
terests
Those apprehensive over how a court might apply a "pure"
best interests test cite the notorious case of Painter v.
Bannister"s in which the Supreme Court of Iowa awarded custody of a minor to his grandparents in preference to his father.
The grandparents' home provided "a stable, dependable, con43
ventional, middle-class, middlewest background," whereas
his father's home, although offering "more freedom of conduct
and. . . an opportunity to develop his individual talents," was
"romantic, impractical and unstable."44
The Iowa court claimed that "it is not our prerogative to
determine custody upon our choice of one of two ways of life
within normal and proper limits," but it certainly appeared
to do just that. The court concluded that the child's life in his
father's home "would be unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohe4
mian, and probably intellectually stimulating." That, however, would not be in the best interests of the child, since in
the opinion of the court, "security and stability in the home are
more important than intellectual stimulation in the proper
development of a child." 47 As one critic has noted, the court's
decision was based not on empirical studies, but on the court's
own value judgment about "what kind of a child one hopes to
produce: a decision that society normally leaves to the parents."4"
Although the Painterdecision illustrates the potential for
abuse of the best interests standard, in most jurisdictions in
which the test has been adopted, it has been modified by judiFreed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 423 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Foster &
Freedi; Note, Alternatives to "ParentalRight" in Child Custody Disputes Involving
Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Alternatives].

41.

Comment, The Foster Parents' Dilemma: "Who Can I Turn to When Some-

body Needs Me?", 11 SAN DIEco L. REv. 376, 388 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Foster

Parents' Dilemmal.
42. 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
43. Id. at 1393, 140 N.W.2d at 154.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1396, 140 N.W.2d at 156.
47. Id.
48. Kay & Philips, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 717,
721 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Kay & Philips].
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cial construction" to require an initial finding that the parent
is unfit. ' 0 Essentially this creates a "legal presumption that the
natural parent is fit and that his home is a good one. The
burden of proof is upon the contender to show that the parent
is unfit."'" Another common modification of the best interests
test is the assumption" that the welfare of the child is best
served by awarding custody to the parents.53 In the words of one
commentator,
[Tihe parent will start off with a strong initial advantage. . . .[T]his is not because the courts are expressly
deferring to notions of parental rights in this connection,
but because long experience, observation and common
sense have all served to implant the lesson that prima facie
at any rate the best place for a child is with its parent. 4
The multiplicity and complexity of these devices have led
some to conclude that, at best, the "pure" best interests test
is unworkable and, at worst, the test is a "mere cloak for the
operation of judicial intuition."" Reluctance to accept the
"best interests" test can also be attributed to a concern that
adoption of the test would render it easier for the courts to
"interfere" with family relationships-a power that some com49. The tendency of courts to resort to procedural devices to give greater protection to parental interests in such'cases may be due to a judicial attitude described by
Pound as follows:
Tenderness of the individual interests of parents, since legal interference
in family relations touches individuals in a peculiarly sensitive spot, has
induced hesitation in changing established rules, even where reasons for
change were evident.
Pound, supra note 3, at 187.
50. Simpson, supra note 10; Foster & Freed, supra note 40, at 425: "The best
interest test usually has been accepted, if at all, in modified form."
See, e.g., Jackson v. Jackson, 164 Kan. 319, 190 P.2d 426 (1948); Commonwealth
v. Kraus, 185 Pa. Super. 167, 138 A.2d 225 (1958); Sweeney v. Joneson, 75 S.D. 213,
63 N.W.2d 249 (1954); Judd v. Van Horn, 195 Va. 988, 81 S.E.2d 432 (1954).
51. Simpson, supra note 10, at 355; see, e.g., Jackson v. Jackson, 164 Kan. 319,
190 P.2d 426 (1948); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952); Sweeney v. Joneson,
75 S.D. 213, 63 N.W.2d 249 (1954); Judd v. Van Horn, 195 Va. 988, 81 S.E.2d 432
(1954).
52. Foster & Freed, supra note 40, at 437, contend that in many cases this
assumption in effect creates a conclusive presumption in favor of the natural parents.
53. See, e.g., Root v. Allen, 151 Colo. 311, 377 P.2d 117 (1962); Jackson v. Jackson, 164 Kan. 319, 190 P.2d 426 (1948); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952);
Sweeney v. Joneson, 75 S.D. 213, 63 N.W.2d 249 (1954); Judd v. Van Horn, 195 Va.
988, 81 S.E.2d 432 (1954).
54. Michaels, The Dangers of a Change of Parentage in Custody and Adoption
Cases, 83 L.Q. REV. 547, 548 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Michaels].
55. Alternatives, supra note 40, at 154.
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345

mentators feel is already too freely available under the broadly
written juvenile court statutes. 5
The best interests test and its modifications are reflected
in the California statutes and cases. The stated intention of the
legislature in enacting the Freedom from Parental Custody and
Control Act 57 (which includes Civil Code section 232) was "to
extend adoption services for the benefit of children."I' Furthermore, Civil Code section 232.5 directs that the chapter "be
liberally construed'59to serve and protect the interests and welfare of the child.
California cases prior to the enactment of Civil Code section 232.5 had held that in abandonment proceedings the emphasis was upon the parents' intent to abandon, and that the
°
child's best interest was not an issue." In subsequent cases
courts looked to the legislative history:
the Legislature had become concerned with the rigidity of
existing custody rules preferential to the natural parents
over third parties

....

[T]he trial court must now con-

sider, in a liberal application of those provisions, the best
interest and welfare of the child before reaching its conclusion upon the issue of abandonment."'
Other courts also recognized that "the modern trend of
cases and authorities places a growing emphasis on the paramount interest of the child" in contrast to the "previous feudalistic view which claimed a parental property right in the
62However, in an important recent custody case, In
...
child.
56. See, e.g., Crary, supra note 34, at 81: "Many engaged in social work are
inclined to the idea that the child is better off with proper institutional care than he
is in a home that is sub-standard." Dobson, supra note 27, at 398:
It is to be feared that where the power to make disposition of a child
exists, disposition will be made; the power will be exercised, rather than
held in reserve. Those courts most committed to the doctrine of parens
patriae most often commit.
Edwards, The Rights of Children, 37 FED. PROB. 34, 38 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Edwardsl: "So many of the cases coming to the court could and should have been
diverted earlier and would therefore not be before the court."
57. CAL. Civ. CODE § 232 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
58. Cal. Stats. (1970), ch. 583, § 1, at 1160 (West Leg. Serv.) (emphasis added).
59. CAL. Civ. CODE § 232.5 (West Supp. 1975).
60. See, e.g., In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 P. 161 (1912); In re Bisenius, 173 Cal.
App. 2d 518, 343 P.2d 319 (1959); Ex parte Landry, 61 Cal. App. 2d 230, 142 P.2d 432
(1943).
61. In re Neal, 265 Cal. App. 2d 482, 489-90, 71 Cal. Rptr. 300, 305 (1968); accord,
In re S.M., 39 Cal. App. 3d 40, 113 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1974); In re Adoption of Morrow, 9
Cal. App. 3d 39, 88 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1970).
62. In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629, 105 Cal. Rptr. 736, 740 (1972); accord, In
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re B.G.," the California Supreme Court rejected the pure "best
interest of the child" test and reversed a decision in which the
trial court, on that ground, had awarded custody to a nonparent against a fit parent. Although the case had originated in
juvenile court, the supreme court applied Civil Code section
4600, which requires that
[b]efore the court makes any order awarding custody to
a person or persons other than a parent

. . .

it shall make

a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be
detrimental to the child."

The court analyzed the legislative history of the detriment
standard, placing particular emphasis on the following excerpt
from the Assembly Journal:
The important point is that the intent of the Legislature is that the court consider parental custody to be
highly preferable. Parental custody must be clearly detrimental to the child before custody can be awarded to a
nonparent 5
The court concluded that although the Family Law Act"6
changed the emphasis in custody cases from fitness of the parents to detriment to the child, it did not change the judicial
practice of awarding custody to nonparents "only in unusual
' '7
and extreme cases.
The adoption of the detriment to the child test in Civil
Code section 232(a)(7)6" undoubtedly represents a legislative
intention that parental rights should receive at least as much
protection in termination proceedings (which permanently
sever the parent-child relationship)"9 as in custody disputes.
re Barnett, 54 Cal. 2d 370, 354 P.2d 18, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1960).
63. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
64. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1975).
65. 11 Cal. 3d at 698, 523 P.2d at 257, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 457, quoting 4 ASSEM. J.
8060-61 (Reg. Sess. 1969).
66. CAL.. CIV. CoDE § 4600 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
67. 11 Cal. 3d at 698, 523 P.2d at 257, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
68. CAL.. Civ. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1975). For the text of this subsection
see note 15 supra.
69. In In re Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App. 3d 510, 110 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1973), the court
noted that in termination proceedings "the state seeks to deprive a parent of all further
parental relationships with a child .... " Id. at 514, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 58. By contrast,
custody orders are modifiable upon a showing of changed circumstances: "In the
event
of an appropriate change in circumstances, appellant may, of course, apply to the
trial
court for modification of the custody order." Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 3d 39,
47,
119 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (1975). An order terminating parental rights is not modifiable.
CAl.. C l'. CODE § 238 (West Supp. 1975).

19761

PARENTAL RIGHTS

Adoption of the test provides a uniform standard for custody
disputes between parents and third parties, regardless of the
forum of the dispute: a juvenile court disposition, a custody
dispute following dissolution of a marriage, or a termination
proceeding.7" As interpreted by the B.G. court, the detriment
test, while focusing the inquiry on the interests of the child
rather than the fitness of the parent, nevertheless is highly
preferential to parental rights.7
THE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD

Perhaps the most unusual element of Civil Code section
232(a)(7) is the requirement that the necessary factors for
termination of parental rights-that return of a child to its
parents would be detrimental to the child, that parents are
unable to provide a home, care and control and to maintain an
adequate parental relationship with the child-must be shown
beyond a reasonabledoubt."3 The standard of proof that applies
to court findings under the remaining parts of Civil Code section 232 is the normal civil burden of a preponderance of the
evidence. The reasonable doubt standard undoubtedly represents a legislative intention that the highest degree of protection be afforded parental rights; such a high standard, however, seems inappropriate.
Courts are often urged to look to the true nature of an
action in determining what safeguards should be applied to
protect the rights of the parties. Judge Rives, dissenting from
a decision denying a free transcript to an indigent mother,
argued:
[A] child custody proceeding also amounts to far more
than an ordinary civil action. . . . Denominating this ac70. The California Supreme Court has emphasized the need for a uniform rule
because of the numerous proceedings in which custody disputes can be litigated in
California. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 696 n.25, 523 P.2d 244, 256 n.25, 114 Cal. Rptr.
444, 456 n.25. Citing B.G. on the desirability of applying a uniform test, one court
recently applied the detriment to the child test in a termination proceeding. In re
Susan Lynn M., 53 Cal. App. 3d 300, 314, 125 Cal. Rptr. 707, 716 (1975).
For an excellent article on the several proceedings in which child custody disputes
are handled, see Bodenheimer, The Multiplicity of Child Custody ProceedingsProblems in California Law, 23 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1971).
71. 11 Cal. 3d at 698, 523 P.2d at 257, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
72. CAL.. Civ. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1975). For the entire text of this
subsection see note 15 supra.
73. Id.
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tion as civil cannot, by some talismanic effect blind us to
the fundamental importance of the values at stake here.74
Recognizing parental rights as fundamental in the constitutional sense75 does not necessarily compel application of a
higher than normal standard of proof; however, that result is
not uncommon. For example, the United States Supreme
Court, in Woodby v. Immigration and NaturalizationService,76
held that "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence" was
required to support a deportation order. The Court characterized deportation as a "drastic deprivation" and stated that the
civil rather than criminal nature of the proceeding did not
justify "banish[ment] from this country upon no higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence case." 77
Termination of parental rights has also been called a
"drastic remedy""8 and, such proceedings have been compared
with criminal prosecutions. In the words of one court, "the loss
of parental relationship to [one's] child may be vastly greater
punishment than levying of a fine or even imprisonment resulting from a criminal conviction." 79 Since the preference for parental custody is so firmly embedded in California law,'" it is
probably appropriate that a higher than normal standard of
proof be required.
On the other hand, the rights of the parents are not the
only rights at issue in such cases. Increasing attention is being
focused on the rights of children, 8 and some persons believe
that those rights will take on constitutional dimensions no less
compelling than the rights of parents. A recent New York decision took just such a position:
Here, the constitutional rights of the respondent mother
74. Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1025 (5th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970).
75. For a good analysis of the doctrine of fundamental rights as applied to family
relationships, see generally Comment, Dependency Hearings: What Rights for the
Parents?, 6 U.C.D.L. REV. 240 (1973).
76. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
77. Id. at 285.
78. In re T.M.R., 41 Cal App. 3d 694, 703, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292, 298 (1974).
79. In re Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App. 3d 510, 514, 110 Cal. Rptr. 56, 58 (1973).
80. See, e.g., In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974);
Stewart v. Stewart, 41 Cal. 2d 447, 260 P.2d 44 (1953); In re T.M.R., 41 Cal. App. 3d
694, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1974); In re Gano, 160 Cal. App. 2d 700, 325 P.2d 485 (1958);
In re Cattalini, 72 Cal. App. 2d 662, 165 P.2d 250 (1946); In re Gutierrez, 47 Cal. App.
128 (1920).
81. See authorities cited in note 39 supra.
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are superseded by those of the infant Tyease. The constitutional rights of the infant to a stable, permanent home
cannot be disrupted by the mother's desire to have her
child for the first time after four years of inexcusable sleep82
ing on her duties and on her rights.

Parental preference is built into the standard at the outset,
since termination of parental rights must be based on a finding
that return of the child to the parent would be detrimental to
the child. 3 A standard of clear and convincing evidence would
seem to protect the parents' rights adequately without making
termination a practical impossibility in those cases where it is
appropriate."4
EVIDENCE REQUIREMENTS

Another problem'area in termination proceedings involves
the evidence that may be introduced. Upon what kind of evidence may a court base a finding that return of a child to his
parent would be detrimental to the child?
ProbationReports
Probably the most frequently used evidence is the report
submitted by a probation officer pursuant to Civil Code section
233. s1 "The law sets no limits on the contents of such a report
and of course, hearsay evidence . . . often constitutes a major
portion of the report."" Interpreting a similar provision in the
82. In re Tyease "J.", 1 FAM. L. RFrR. 2731, 2732 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1975).
83. CAL. CIv. ConE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1975). For the complete text of this
subsection see note 15 supra.
For a discussion of the detriment to the child test as a test preferential to parental
rights, see text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
84. That such a burden of proof may amount to a practical impossibility may
account for the fact that to date there are no reported cases construing this subsection.
85. CAL.. Civ. CODE § 233 (West Supp. 1975) provides in pertinent part:
Upon the filing of such petition, the clerk of the court shall, in accordance
with the direction of the court, immediately notify the juvenile probation
officer, or the county department designated by the board of supervisors
to administer the public social services program, who shall immediately
investigate the circumstances of said minor person and the circumstances
which are alleged to bring said minor person within any of the provisions
of Section 232. The juvenile probation officer or the county department
shall render to the court a written report of the investigation with a
recommendation to the court of the proper disposition to be made in the
action in the best interests of said minor person. The court shall receive
such report in evidence and shall read and consider the contents thereof
in rendering its judgment.
86. Edwards, supra note 56, at 39.
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Welfare and Institutions Code, 7 the court in Long v. Long held
that since the reports are primarily hearsay evidence, certain
procedural safeguards must be read into the section to protect
the rights of the parties:
Due process of law requires that each party (a) receive a
copy of the report, (b) be given an opportunity to crossexamine the investigative officer and to subpoena and examine persons whose hearsay statements are contained in
the report, and (c) be permitted to introduce evidence by
way of rebuttal. 8
The Long court was particularly concerned with the dangers inherent in a denial of the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination. 9 In that case the report contained statements by the father claiming that the mother was unfit and
that he had been tricked into signing an adoption consent form.
In court and under oath, however, he declined to make those
allegations2 °
Even with due process safeguards an adverse probation
department report can be very difficult to overcome. A recent
case, Chaffin v. Frye,"' is illustrative. In this case the mother
was attempting to gain custody of her children, who had been
living with their maternal grandparents.2 The findings of the
87. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 582 (West 1972). A report may be submitted
in domestic relations cases pursuant to CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 263 (West 1954). Courts
treat these reports similarly, without regard to the section used. See, e.g., Dahl v. Dahl,
237 Cal. App. 2d 407, 46 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1965); Forslund v. Forslund, 225 Cal. App. 2d
602, 37 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1964).
88. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 736, 59 Cal. Rtpr. at 794; accord, Wheeler v. Wheeler,
34 Cal. App. 3d 239, 109 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1973).
Compare CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 582 (West 1972), which contains no procedural safeguards, with CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 263 (West 1954), which provides in
pertinent part:
[Niot less than 10 days before the trial of such action a copy of the report
shall be served on each party to the divorce action.
Such investigator or investigators who have investigated the care,
welfare and custody of the minor children as provided for in this section,
shall be present at the trial of the divorce action of the parties who are
the parents or custodians of such minor children, and may be called to
testify by the judge or either party as to any matter which they have
investigated. The testimony of such investigators shall be subject to questions direct and cross which are proper, and shall be competent as evidence.
89. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 736, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
90. Id.
91. 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975).
92. Id. at 43, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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court were based almost entirely on the probation report, which
included information about the mother's income and living
conditions, her arrest record, and her status as a homosexual,
as well as information about the grandparents' home and in3
come and their opinions about the mother.
Facts relating to income and living conditions clearly are
relevant when considering ability to provide care and a home
for a child, but such evidence should not be used to compare
competing homes. The statute, in unambiguous terms, requires
that before parental rights may be terminated it must be found
that "return of the child to his parent or parents would be
detrimental to the child." 4 It is suggested that until the parents' home has been found detrimental, information about a
"competing" home should be inadmissible as irrelevant. 5
In addition to relevant factual material, the probation report in the Chaffin case99 contained statements of the probation
officer's opinions and beliefs. For example, the mother admitted past homosexual conduct, but testified that she had not
engaged in homosexual activity for two years;" however, the
report stated that "the probation officer believes the possibility
of homosexual conduct still exists." 9 The children told the
9
officer that they preferred to live with their mother, but he
"believed that some of the children's statements were rehearsed."'9 9 It is difficult to know what kind of evidence the
mother could have presented to overcome this "opinion evidence."
Any probation report is expected to contain a recommendation,'0 ' but it seems questionable whether the officer's opinions and beliefs should be included. If the court is persuaded
93. Id. at 43-44, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
94. CAL.. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1975). For the full text of this subsection, see note 15 supra.
95. It is interesting to note that as long as certain minimum standards are met
(adequate nourishment, clothing and shelter), psychologists and psychiatrists do not
consider environmental factors as particularly significant to child-rearing ability.
Alternatives, supra note 40, at 159-60 n.38.
96. 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975).
97. Id. at 43, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. CAL. CiV. CODE § 233 (West Supp. 1975) provides in pertinent part: "The
juvenile probation officer or the county department shall render to the court a written
report of the investigation with a recommendation to the court of the proper disposition
"
to be made ....
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by the probation officer's opinion before ever hearing the parent's testimony or evidence, it is arguable that the burden of
proof has unfairly been shifted to the parent to prove his fitness. 02 A fair hearing requires that evidence be produced by all
parties, and that the court weigh the evidence and draw its own
conclusions. 103
It should also be noted that the probation officer is directed by statute to base his recommendation on "the best
interests of said minor person," 0 4 whereas the termination petition can be granted only if the court finds that "return of the
child to his parent or parents would be detrimental to the
child."'' 5 This difference could be very significant since, as discussed in the previous section, under the best interests test
parental custody isn't necessarily preferred,' 6 while the detriment to the child test is highly preferential to the parents'
interests.07 The difference between the tests should be brought
to the attention of the court when the recommendation of the
probation officer is being considered.
102. In cases involving return of a child to his parent after the child has been
the subject of abuse or neglect, the burden generally is on the parent to prove that he
can adequately care for the child. Premature return of children to abusive parents
presents a serious risk to the child since there is a high repeat record for abusive
parents. One study concluded that 25 to 50 percent of the children would be permanently injured or killed within a few months following a premature return to their
homes. Grumet, The Plaintive Plaintiffs: Victims of the Battered Child Syndrome, 4
FAM. L.Q. 296, 304 (1970).
In California, the cases of such children are subject to an annual review at which
time the parents have the opportunity "to show cause, if they have cause, why the
jurisdiction of the court over the minor should be terminated." CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 729 (West 1972).
103. The power of decision vested in the trial court is to be exercised
by a duly constituted judge, and that power may not be delegated to
investigators or other subordinate officials or attaches of the court, or
anyone else.
Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 589, 122 P.2d 96, 101 (1942), quoted with
approval in Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 436, 144 P.2d 592, 595 (1943). The Fewel
court emphasized that the purpose of the report is "to assist the court and not to
replace it." Id. at 434, 114 P.2d at 594; accord, Prouty v. Prouty, 16 Cal. 2d 190, 105
P.2d 295 (1940).
If the court is persuaded by the report before hearing the parents' evidence, an
issue of prejudgment may arise. Compare Webber v. Webber, 33 Cal. 2d 153, 199 P.2d
934 (1948) with In re Davis, 162 Cal. App. 2d 648, 328 P.2d 455 (1958).
104. CAL. CiV. CODE § 233 (West Supp. 1975). See note 85 supra.
105. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1975). For the text of this subsection, see note 15 supra.
106. See authorities cited in notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
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Parent-ChildRelationship
In addition to the issues of providing a home and adequate
physical care of the child, Civil Code section 232(a)(7) requires
a finding that the parents "are likely to fail in the future, to
• . . maintain an adequate parental relationship with the
child."'' 8 Such a finding cannot be based simply on the fact
that the parents, in the past, "so conducted themselves that
they were deprived of the custody of their children" ;,01 however,
it would seem that a court will have to review and evaluate the
past and present parent-child relationship in order to make a
meaningful prediction about the future. A strong factor against
the mother in the Chaffin case"' was her past unwillingness to
assume responsibility for her children (they had lived with
their grandparents for nearly their entire lives). On the basis
of that conduct, the court characterized her efforts to gain custody as "temporary good intentions.""'
An important factor in evaluating the parent-child relationship is the nature and quality of parent-child communications and visits during the period that the child has been living
out of the home. Although this is not an easy evaluation to
make, the task is not completely unfamiliar to the courts. In
abandonment proceedings it is within the discretion of the
court to determine whether efforts to communicate with the
child have been "only token efforts.""' Three communications
in one year was considered mere token in In re Adoption of
Oukes.1"' Although the mother in that case testified that her
108. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1975). For the entire text of this
subsection, see note 15 supra.
109. In re Adoption of Morrow, 9 Cal. App. 3d 39, 52, 88 Cal. Rptr. 142, 149
(1970).
110. Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975).
111. Id. at 46, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 25; accord, In re Adoption of Morrow, 9 Cal. App.
3d 39, 88 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1970) (affirming an order freeing a child from the custody
and control of the mother, the court noted that the mother failed to visit the child,
though she regularly visited her other children who were in other placements); In re
Maxwell, 117 Cal. App. 2d 156, 255 P.2d 87 (1953) (held that complete lack of effort
by the mother to maintain contact with her child could support a finding of abandonment, even though the original "leaving" of the child did not amount to an intent to
abandon).
112. CAL. Civ. CODE § 232(a)(1) (West Supp. 1975). According to the court in In
re Gano, 160 Cal. App. 2d 700, 325 P.2d 485 (1958), the California Legislature amended
the statute to give the trial judge discretion to determine that the communications
were "token only" because the California Supreme Court had held that if either parent
made any communication with the child during the one year period, abandonment
could not be found. See, e.g., In re Edwards, 208 Cal. 725, 284 P. 916 (1930).
113. 14 Cal. App. 3d 459, 92 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1971).
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failure to communicate was due to emotional and mental
strain, the court, noting that she had maintained frequent contact with her other children, stated that that was not a legal
excuse." 4 A finding that two letters a month was token only was
reversed in In re T.M.R.,"15 since the mother was in jail and
letters were her only means of maintaining contact with her
children."'
A particularly difficult problem in this area arises when
the parents do not communicate with their children in foster
care because they were discouraged or prevented from doing
SO." 7 The prevailing view among social welfare workers has
been that "foster parents are often unable to properly train,
discipline, and educate the child when the child is visited by
his natural parents, who may undermine the authority of the
foster parents.""' In neglect and child abuse cases it is indeed
often in the child's best'interest not to permit parental contact,
at least for some time after placement." 9 In other cases, however, recent studies in child development have indicated that
children in foster homes demonstrate fewer behavior problems
if they are able to maintain contact with their own parents. 20
Courts and welfare agencies should encourage and assist parents in maintaining meaningful contact with their children in
placement, 2 ' thus implementing the goal of the Juvenile Court
114. Id. at 468, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
115. 41 Cal. App. 3d 694, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1974); accord, In re Susan Lynn
M., 53 Cal. App. 3d 300, 125 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975) (monthly visits were not "token
only" even though the welfare department had made arrangements for semi-monthly
visits).
116. 41 Cal. App 3d at 699-700, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
117. Even when the parents are not actively discouraged or prohibited from
visiting their children in foster care, the parents may believe that they are not supposed to visit their children. See, e.g., In re Barton, 168 Cal. App. 2d 584, 336 P.2d
210 (1959). The mother in that case said she did not communicate with her child
because "she was under the impression the court order which deprived her of custody
forbade her to communicate with the child or bother the petitioners as guardians." Id.
at 589, 336 P.2d at 214 (emphasis added).
118. Jensen, The Child Without a Family: Problems in the Custody and Adoption of Children, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 633, 634 (1962).
119. See In re Adoption of Morrow, 9 Cal. App. 3d 39, 88 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1970)
(the evidence indicated that the child-six years old-was very frightened of her
mother, vomited and hid when the mother came to visit, and reverted to bed-wetting
after the visit).
120. Macintyre, Adolescence, Identity, and FosterFamily Care, 17 CHILDREN 213
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Macintyre].
121. In a recent case, In re Susan Lynn M., 53 Cal. App. 3d 300, 125 Cal. Rptr.
707 (1975), the court of appeal interpreted section 232 of the Civil Code, stating that
"the Legislature obviously intended that every effort be made to reunite the family
during the waiting period." Id. at 311 n.3, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 714 n.3.
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22
Law to "preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties."' It
may also render it easier to locate the parents for purposes of
notice for those cases in which termination proceedings are
necessary.
Expert witnesses (psychiatrists, psychologists, and social
workers) are likely to be called on the issue of the parent-child
relationship whenever the parties can afford them. Although
this can be very helpful for the court, it is not without its
problems. It can give one side a tremendous advantage if the
opposing side cannot afford an expert; 2 ' on the other hand, if
both sides present experts the court may be faced with a "classic battle of the experts."' 24
The case against the parent would seem to be quite strong
if the nonparent has been in custody for a sufficient length of
time to have become the "psychological parent" of the child.

Whether any adult becomes the "psychological parent" of
Accordingly, we embrace the viewpoint that before initiating proceedings
to declare a minor free from the custody of its parents under section 232
of the Civil Code, a county welfare department must consider child protective services as a possible solution to the problems at hand and must
offer such services to qualified parents if appropriate under the circumstances. Child protective services are designed to preserve the family unit
through education, guidance and other social services, and ordinary concepts of human compassion impel the conclusion that the possibility of
offering these services to the parents in a "last ditch" effort to save the
family should be weighed carefully by social welfare departments before
such departments embark on a course which at best offers a drastic and
irrevocable solution.
Id. at 311, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14; accord, Macintyre, supra note 120.
One of the few studies that has been conducted on the families of children in foster
care revealed a severe deterioration of the family structure. The authors studied the
families of 624 children under the age of 13 years who had entered foster care for the
first time in 1966 in New York City. Interviews with 390 parents revealed that in only
13 percent of the cases did a basic mother-father-child family unit exist. Seventy-nine
percent of the mothers headed single-parent homes. By contrast, 46 percent of the
mothers themselves had been raised in single-parent families or in homes other than
the homes of their natural parents. Jenkins & Norman, Families of Children in Foster
Care, 16 CHILDREN 155 (1969).
122. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 502 (West 1972).
123. Discussing this problem, one commentator recounted the following incident:
The psychiatrist not being amenable to the mother's purpose, his testimony was, of course, not called for in court. The father, an unworldly man
• . . never realized that expert testimony was buried somewhere which
might have been of help to him.
J. DESPERT, CHILDREN OF DIvoRcE 210 (1953).
124. Kay & Philips, supra note 48, at 723. The authors cite as an example a case
from their files in which five expert witnesses testified concerning the fitness of the
parties. Id. at 723-24.
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the child is based. . . on day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. The role can be fulfilled
• . . by . . . any caring adult, whatever his biological or
legal relationship to the child may be.' 25
Even without expert testimony courts are aware that continuity and stability "are potent factors which carry great persuasiveness in the determination of what would serve the children's best interests."'2 6
In conclusion, then, problems for parents do exist in the
area of evidence requirements for termination proceedings. The
probation report may include the investigating officer's opinions, as well as relevant factual material, and the recommendation in the report will be based on the best interests of the child,
not on the detriment to the child test. In addition, evidence on
the parent-child relationship can be a problem for parents if
they have been discouraged from maintaining contact with
their child and if the parent cannot afford an expert witness,
but the party seeking termination can afford one.
NEED FOR PERMANENT PLACEMENTS AND SPEEDY DECISIONS

One of the most severe shortcomings of the proceedings for
termination of parental rights is that there is no requirement
for a permanent placement of the child. If the termination
petition is granted, the child may be placed for adoption. However, if the petition is denied, the child will not necessarily
return to his parents. Foster care may be continued, since
"once juvenile court jurisdiction is established, that jurisdiction continues as long as the best interests of the minor so
require."' 27
The evidence seems overwhelming that long-term "temporary," care, with its attendant lack of continuity, can be disastrous in terms of normal child development.' 28 Children in longterm care usually have two or three foster homes; the length of
time and the number of placements are directly related to the
125.

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 40, at 19.
126. Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 46, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (1975); accord,
Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs. of Wis., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972) (unwed father has a
right to a hearing prior to adoption of his child; at the hearing the trial court should
consider the length of time the child has already lived with the adoptive parents).
127. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 692, 523 P.2d 244, 252, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 452
(1975).
128. See generally BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 40, at ch. 3; Michaels,
supra note 54; Foster Parents' Dilemma, supra note 41.
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incidence of emotional disturbance.' 9 Recognizing the child's
interest in a stable and permanent environment, one court concluded that "the state as a parens patriaenot only has a compelling interest but also a duty to sever the parental bonds once
the situation contemplated by the statute arises."' 30 After serving on the juvenile court bench, one judge concluded,
"[S]omeone has to be hurt in this type of case and it is better
to hurt the parents after they have been given every reasonable
chance than to condemn the innocent child to a life of insecurity.)", 31
The child's interest in a permanent environment is also
adversely affected by the time required for appeals. A brief
review of recent cases indicates that the time between the filing
of the petition and the final appellate decision is approximately
two years.' 31 Courts must begin to view placement decisions "as
the emergency that it is for the child."' 3 3
It is recommended that courts handle custody cases (including termination proceedings) on an emergency basis to reduce the time awaiting appeal to the minimum. In addition,
every effort should be made when a termination proceeding is
brought to render a decision that will recognize the child's need
for a permanent environment: the child should be returned to
his parents or freed for adoption. For those few cases in which
it is desirable neither to terminate parental rights nor to return
the child to the parent, 34it has been suggested that "permanent"
foster care be devised.'
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Civil Code section 232(a)(7), the most recent legislative
enactment concerning termination of parental rights, is consistent with the current trend in California law. That trend represents a continuing preference for parental rights and a determination that the standard to be applied in both custody and
termination proceedings is the "detriment to the child" test.
129. Macintyre, supra note 120, at 214.
130. In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629, 105 Cal. Rptr. 736, 740 (1972).
131. Crary, supra note 34, at 81 (emphasis added).
132. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974) (petition
heard March, 1972); In re J., 31 Cal. App. 3d 238, 107 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1973) (petition
filed May, 1971); In re Adoption of Morrow, 9 Cal. App. 3d 39, 88 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1970)
(petition filed January, 1968).
133. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 40, at 43.
134. Simpson, supra note 10, at 391.
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Although the reasonable doubt standard of proof may be too
high, a standard higher than a mere preponderance does seem
appropriate.
Certain changes in the law are recommended. Parents
should be advised at the time their child is placed in foster care
that such care is temporary, but that under certain circumstances a proceeding to terminate their rights may be brought.
The circumstances should be clearly explained. Parents should
be encouraged to maintain communication with their children
in foster care, and services should be available to help the
family prepare for return of the child. All cases should be reviewed regularly, and once a termination proceeding has been
brought, every effort should be made to arrive at a permanent
placement: return to parents, adoption, or permanent foster
care. The time for appeals must be reduced, since extended
periods of uncertainty and insecurity are detrimental to all
parties. By better protecting the important interests of both
parents and children in termination proceedings, such changes
would render those proceedings more equitable to both parents
and children.
Coeta Chambers

